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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1990s, over a dozen people have filed lawsuits against
handgun manufacturers for their role in making handguns widely available for
criminal misuse.' Prior to February 1999, however, no person had ever been able to
successfully recover monetary damages from a handgun manufacturer for the
criminal misuse of a handgun.2 On February 12, 1999, a federal jury in Hamilton v.
Accu-TeP found three handgun manufacturers collectively liable for the near fatal
shooting of Stephen Fox, a sixteen-year-old boy from Queens, New York.4 Because
I See generally Timothy Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain Future of Negligent
Marketing Claims Against Firearm Manufacturers, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 681 (1998).
2 See Bob VanVoris, Weinstein Does it Again: The Maverick Federal Judge Opens the Door in a
Novel Handgun Lawsuit, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 15, 1999, at AI.
3 62 F. Supp.2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
4 See id. at 808. The jury's verdict was very specific. The jury found fifteen handgun
manufacturers negligent and found that nine of those proximately caused injury to one or more of the
plaintiffs. No damages were awarded to six of the seven plaintiffs. Interestingly, two plaintiffs were not
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Stephen Fox could not link his injuries to any specific .25 caliber handgun
manufacturer, Judge Jack Weinstein allowed the jury to apportion liability
according to each manufacturers' share of the national .25 caliber handgun market.5
The federal jury in Hamilton found three handgun manufacturers collectively liable
for failing to "exercise reasonable care" in their marketing and distribution
practices and for failing to take reasonable steps to guard against the criminal
misuse of their .25 caliber handgun products.6 On June 3, 1999, Judge Weinstein
issued a one hundred and thirteen page opinion that upheld the jury's findings of
fact and firmly supported the application of market share liability against the three
negligent handgun manufacturers. Hamilton was the first case in American
jurisprudence to impose an affirmative duty upon handgun manufacturers to market
and distribute handguns in a manner that prevents future criminal misuse.8
Part II of this note traces the complex procedural history of the Hamilton
case from its inception to its final culmination into a $4 million jury verdict against
three handgun manufacturers. 9 Part III outlines the history behind the most
commonly asserted claims against handgun manufacturers. Next, Part IV analyzes
how the plaintiffs in Hamilton were able to hold the handgun industry liable for the
criminal acts of third parties under a negligent marketing and distribution theory
and examines how the Hamilton case has plowed new ground for negligent
marketing and distribution claims against handgun manufacturers. Finally, Part V
outlines how Judge Weinstein's approval, in Hamilton, of the collective liability
theory will likely limit its overall applicability outside the state of New York and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. °
awarded any damages even though the jury found both negligence and proximate cause against six
defendants. Stephen Fox was the only plaintiffto recover damages. See id. at 811-12.
5 See id. at 837. Police, never recovered the .25 caliber handgun that was used to shoot one gunshot
victim, Stephen Fox. All police found at the scene was a spent .25 caliber shell casing. See id.
6 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 832-33. The following manufacturers were held liable according
to their respective share of the .25 caliber handgun market: American Arms, Inc. (.23% liability), Beretta
U.S.A. Corp. (6.03% liability), and Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc. (6.8% liability). See id. at 808.
7 See id. at 848.
8 See Lisa Gelhaus, Brooklyn Jury Adds Momentum to Anti-Gun Litigation, TRIAL MAG., April 1,
1999. available in 1999 WL 17784097; see also Mark Hamblett, Verdict Against Handgun Manufacturers
Upheld. N. Y. L. J., May 27, 1999, at 2.
9 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 811. Although the jury awarded $4 million in total damages to
Stephen Fox and his family, Judge Weinstein reduced this amount after trial to reflect each of the three
negligent manufacturers market share (.23% for American Arms, 6.03% for Beretta U.S.A., and 6.8% for
Taurus International). The total amount recovered was $522,400. See id. at 848.
10 See generally David Kairys, Legal Claims of Cities Against the Manufacturers of Handguns, 71
TEMP. L. REv. 1 (1998). As of September 30, 2000, twenty-nine cities and municipal governments had filed
suit against handgun manufacturers seeking compensation for the costs associated with gun violence. See
Harriet Chang and Kevin Fagan, Gunmakers Can Be Sued By Victims: State Court of Appeal Rules in /01
California Street Massacre Case, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 30, 2000, at Al.
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II. THE CONTEXT OF HAMILTON V. ACCU-TEK
Freddie Hamilton and Katina Johnstone were the representatives of
children who were shot with illegally obtained handguns in 1993.11 In January
1995, Ms. Hamilton and Ms. Johnstone filed a civil action against fifty-two
handgun manufacturers in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York in an attempt to recover civil damages for the crimes committed
against their loved ones.12 In April 1996, six additional plaintiffs were joined in toe
action and numerous defendants were summarily dismissed from the case." The
remaining seven plaintiffs in Hamilton levied a total of seven causes of action in
their original complaint.' The first four causes of action against the handgun
manufacturers "[sought] to hold defendants liable for negligence on the theory that
[the] defendants .. .market handguns in a manner that fostered the growth of a
substantial underground market in handguns."' s The plaintiffs claimed that "[t]he
existence of this illicit gun market ... enable[d] youths to buy handguns easily,"
thereby proximately causing the acts of handgun-related violence.' 6 The plaintiffs'
last set of claims sought to hold the defendants strictly liable under both
ultrahazardous liability and products liability laws for failing to use anti-theft
devices that could have prevented the criminal misuse of their products.' 7
In August 1996, Judge Weinstein dismissed the plaintiffs' ultrahazardous
activity and products liability claims but denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment on the remaining negligence claims.' With only a limited
amount of discovery on the defendants' marketing and distribution practices, Judge
Jack Weinstein felt that the plaintiffs' negligent marketing and distribution theory
See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F.Supp. 1307, 1313 (E.D.N.Y 1996). Freddie Hamilton is the
mother of Njuzi Ray who was shot and killed in 1993 with an unidentified .25 caliber handgun. Katina
Johnstone is the widow of David Johnstone who was also killed in 1993 with an unidentified .25 caliber
handgun. Id. at 1314. Mrs. Johnstone's case was later transferred to a federal court in California prior to trial
under New York choice of law jurisprudence. Although Mrs. Johnstone's husband was a New York
domiciliary, he was shot while vacationing in San Francisco. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 47 F. Supp.2d 330,
335 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
12 See id. at 1315.
13 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 808-11. Plaintiffs Diane Zaretsky, Koichi Sunada, Andrea Slade-
Lewis, Veronica Trott, and Maria Santana were all mothers of teenage sons who were shot and killed in New
York City by criminals who used handguns. Gail Fox represented her severely wounded son, Stephen Fox,
who was shot with an unidentified .25 caliber handgun. Just prior to trial, Stephen Fox, substituted himself
as a plaintiff because he had reached the legal age to sue in New York State. Mrs. Fox remained a party to
the suit and was successful in recovering damages for her son's nursing care. See id. at 809.
14 See Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1314. Basically, the plaintiffs' claims fell into three basic areas of
law: negligence, ultrahazardous activity liability, and products liability. See id. at 1314-15.
15 Id. at 1314.
i6 Id.
17 See id. at 1314-15.
is See Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1332.
20001
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should be submitted to the jury.19 He commented that it was quite possible that the
"plaintiffs [would] be able to show that a substantial cause for the killings that are
at the heart of this suit is the operation of a large-scale underground [handgun]
market., 2
0
The Hamilton case finally went to trial in January 1998. After an arduous
four-week trial, the jury found that fifteen of twenty-five defendants marketed and
distributed handguns negligently.21 Although nine defendants were found negligent,
the jury assessed damages against only three handgun manufacturers: American
Arms, Inc., Beretta U.S.A. Corp., and Taurus International Manufacturing, Inc. 2
Ironically, the jury did not award any damages to the two plaintiffs who had
initiated the Hamilton civil action and only awarded damages to Stephen Fox and
his family.23 Stephen Fox and his family recovered a total of $522,400 in damages
from the three handgun manufacturing companies.24
Unbelievably, the Hamilton plaintiffs were able to prove that "industry
knowledge of widespread trafficking in new handguns, heavy movement of guns
from 'weak law' to 'strong law' states, and risks associated with criminals' easy
access to these dangerous instruments" warranted the imposition of collective
liability on the three defendants. 25 The jury agreed with the plaintiffs' fundamental
claim that handgun manufacturers' "indiscriminate marketing and distribution
practices generated an underground market in handguns, providing youths and
violent criminals . . . with easy access to [handguns]. 26 The imposition of
collective liability permitted the judge to apportion each negligent handgun
manufacturers' liability according to its approximate national share of the .25
19 See id. at 1316. Judge Weinstein was impressed with the inference that there may have been a
prevalent understanding within the firearms industry on the precautions available to reduce the sale of
handguns to criminals in urban areas. See id.
20 Id. at 1330.
21 See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp.2d 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
22 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 8 11. Bob VanVoris criticized the jury's verdict in Hamilton as
being suspiciously confusing. See Bob VanVoris, Lawyers Debate Who Won Gun Suit: Contested Result
Makes it Hard for Others to Figure What Verdict Means for Them, NAT'L. L. J., Mar. 1, 1999, at A6.
23 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 811.
24 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 848.
25 Id. at 831. The jury was instructed on the issue of collective liability as follows:
If you find a defendant is responsible for the injury of any plaintiff, that defendant may
be liable in an amount measured by its share of the national market for handguns. By
national market share, I mean production in this country less exports, plus imports.
There are three possible situations as to market share: First, it is not proven by any party
that any particular manufacturer . . . manufactured the handgun in question. Second,
that a particular manufacturer is proven by any party to have manufactured the handgun
in question. And third, that it is proven by any party that only a limited number of
manufacturers could have manufactured the handgun in question.
Id. at 849.
26 Id. at 808.
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Immediately following the trial, the remaining defendants moved for
judgment as a matter of law under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 50(b), stating that:
1) they owed no legally established duty to the plaintiffs for the criminal acts of a
third party; 2) the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendants were
negligent or that any negligence was a proximate cause of Stephen Fox's injuries;
and 3) that market share liability was inapplicable to the plaintiffs' case.28 Judge
Weinstein examined each of these claims in depth and published a landmark
opinion supporting the plaintiffs' negligent marketing and distribution claims and
the imposition of market share liability on American Arms, Beretta, and Taurus.
Manufacturing. 29 Although some observers thought that the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals might overturn Weinstein's opinion, on August 16, 2000, the Second
Circuit refused to do so. 30 Instead, the Second Circuit certified to the New York
Court of Appeals the controversial issue of whether handgun manufacturers owe a
duty of care to prevent the criminal misuse of handguns.3'
III. COMMON TORT CLAIMS AGAINST HANDGUN MANUFACTURERS
Historically, plaintiffs have had a very solid foundation of case law
supporting handgun manufacturer liability for accidental handgun injuries. 2 When
a handgun manufacturer is found to have produced a "defective" handgun, a well-
settled body of product liability law provides that the manufacturer can be held
strictly liable for any injuries that result from such a defect.33 Unfortunately, the
law regarding a handgun manufacturer's liability for the criminal and intentional
misuse of its products has never been this simple.
Plaintiffs have traditionally sued gun manufacturers for criminally-
inflicted injuries under three basic theories of liability: (1) that handgun distribution
and marketing is an "abnormally dangerous" activity that triggers strict liability for
criminal misuse,34 (2) that handguns are defective products because they can be
27 See id. at 811-12. See also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
28 See id. at 817-18.
29 See id at 848.
30 See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2000 WL 1160699, at *1 (2nd Cir. Aug. 16,2000).
31 See id at *2.
32 See, e.g., Gootee v. Colt Indus., 712 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that handgun
manufacturer was liable for violating implied warranty of fitness in an accidental shooting incident); but see,
e.g., Milbrand v. Smith & Wesson, No. 96-CV-0806E (SC), 1998 WL 864885, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 1,
1998) (gun manufacturer found not liable for any "product defect" when a revolver fell off a barroom shelf
and discharged).
33 See Ted Copetas, Handguns Without Child Safety Devices-Defective in Design, 16 J.L. & COM.
171, 175 (1996) (citing 79 AM. JUR. 2D, Weapons and Firearms § 42 (1975)).
34 See Matthew Steffy, Manufacturers' or Marketers' Liability for Criminal Use of Saturday Night
Specials: A New Common Law Approach-Kelley v. R.G. Industries, 497 A.2d 1143, (Md. 1985), 14 FLA. ST.
2000]
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easily sold and used to commit acts of violence,3 s and (3) that handgun
manufacturers' negligent marketing and distribution practices make it easy for
criminals to obtain illegal handguns.36
A. The "Ultrahazardous Activity" Doctrine
The ultrahazardous activity doctrine originated from England in the
famous nineteenth century case Rylands v. Fletcher.3 ' The Rylands court held that
"a defendant will be liable when he damages another by a thing or activity unduly
dangerous and inappropriate to the place where it is maintained., 38 Most courts,
however, including the Western District of New York, have adopted the standard
illuminated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 519 that provides:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is
subject to liability for harm to the person, land, or chattels of
another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the
utmost care to prevent the harm . . . (2) This strict liability is
limited to the kinds of harm, the possibility of which makes the
activity abnormally dangerous.
39
The idea that the marketing and distribution of handguns is ultrahazardous
is premised upon two extremely flawed theories: (1) that the distribution and
marketing, rather than the use, of handguns is an abnormally dangerous activity,
and (2) that the potential risk of criminal handgun misuse outweighs any value that
handguns may have in the community. 40 Although many courts would agree that a
U. L. REV. 149, 151 (1986). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1966). For a more in
depth exposition on the legal history and elements of strict liability see Paul R. Bonney, Manufacturer's Strict
Liabilityfor Handgun Injuries: An Economic Analysis, 73 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1438 (1985).
35 See H. Todd lveson, Manufacturers' Liability to Victims of Handgun Crime: A Common Law
Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 780-81 (1983).
36 See id. at 771-72.
37 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd L.R. I Ex. 265 (1866), affdas Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L.
330 (1868).
38 Andrew 0. Smith, The Manufacture and Distribution of Handguns as an Abnormally Dangerous
Activity, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 369, 381 (1987)(paraphrasing the holding of Rylands).
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1966). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520
(1966) outlines specific factors that courts should take into account when determining whether handgun
distribution is an "abnormally dangerous activity" such as:
The existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of
others; the likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; the extent to which
the activity is not a matter of common usage; the inappropriateness of the activity to the
place where it is carried on; and the extent to which its value to the community is
outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
See id.
40 Andrew J. McClurg, The Tortious Marketing of Handguns: Strict Liability is Dead, Long Live
Negligence, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 777, 788 (1995).
[Vol. 103:81
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handgun could present a "tremendously high risk of great harm," no court has ever
held that the distribution or marketing of handguns is in itself an "abnormally risky
activity."'' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp.42
is a quintessential illustration of the flaws in the ultrahazardous theory. In Perkins,
the Fifth Circuit flatly refused to apply ultrahazardous liability law in criminal
misuse cases because the "marketing of a handgun, as distinguished from its use, is
not an abnormally dangerous activity.
43
Another important tenet of the historical application of the ultrahazardous
activity doctrine is that it has only been applied to abnormal or ultrahazardous uses
of real property.' The fact that no court, including Hamilton, has ever extended the
ultrahazardous doctrine to non-land activities compounds the already inherent
problems of the ultrahazardous liability doctrine in criminal misuse cases.45
Although Judge Weinstein recognized that the marketing and distribution of
handguns could be considered a very broad form of "conduct," he opined that
neither could be considered an "activity" within the meaning of the ultrahazardous
activity doctrine.' Despite Judge Weinstein's strong rebuke of all ultrahazardous
activity claims in Hamilton, plaintiffs in other cases continue to vigorously pursue
ultrahazardous liability claims against handgun manufacturers.47
B. The "Defects " in Product Liability Applicability
In a defective products suit, a plaintiff must prove that "the product in
question was defective so as to render it unreasonably dangerous... beyond that
41 See Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr.2d 146, 191 (1999). The court noted that most
"[a]merican courts have taken the position that the distribution or sale of a firearm is as safe as any other
mechanical device" and that "[e]very decision in common law jurisdictions ... has held that the manufacture
and sale of handguns to the general public does not constitute an ultrahazardous activity." (internal citations
omitted).
42 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985) (Perkins sued the handgun manufacturer of a .25 caliber handgun
that was used to shoot him during a bar fight in Louisiana).
43 Id. at 1265 nA3 (citing the language of Comment (d) to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
519 (1966) that states "liability arises out of the abnormal danger of the activity itself and the risk that it
creates, of harm to those in the vicinity").
44 See Smith, supra note 38, at 382. Examples of strict liability for ultrahazardous uses of land
include roadway blasting, the use of atomic energy, the manufacture and storage of explosives, the operation
of oil and gas wells, the operation of high voltage power lines, and the use of large storage tanks for
flammable materials. Id.
45 See, e.g., Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998)(citing a litany of
federal and state cases that refused to apply the ultrahazardous activity doctrine to the marketing, sale, and
distribution of handguns); see also Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758 (D.C. 1989)(rejecting handgun
marketing as an abnormally dangerous activity in John Hinckley's assassination attempt on President Ronald
Reagan).
46 Hamilton, 935 F. Supp., at 1324. (citing Fomi v. Ferguson, No. 132994-94 slip. op. at 9-10 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 2, 1995)(New York Supreme Court decision holding that a handgun manufacturer could not be
held liable for manufacturing and distributing guns under a strict liability theory).
47 See, e.g., Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr.2d 146.
2000]
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which would be contemplated by an ordinary consumer who purchases it.' 48 Most
courts use a risk-utility analysis to determine whether a product, such as a handgun,
poses an unreasonable risk of harm given its possible utility. 49 Essentially, the risk-
utility test requires the court to weigh the following factors:
The likelihood and gravity of potential injury against the utility of
the product, the availability of other safer products . . . the
obviousness of the danger, public knowledge and expectation of
the danger, the adequacy of instructions and warnings for safe use,
and the ability to eliminate or minimize the danger without
seriously impairing the product or making it unduly expensive.
50
Although the general purpose of products liability law is to provide consumers,
users, and bystanders with an opportunity to recover for the harms caused by
defective products, courts have long recognized that a handgun is not "defective"
just because it is used in a crime. 1
Generally, a design defect claim against a handgun manufacturer requires
strict proof that the particular handgun at issue is "unreasonably dangerous, given
its intended use.",5 2 Handgun manufacturers have not been held liable for criminal
misuse of handguns because often their intended use is to kill or wound.5 From a
risk-utility standpoint, the "risk of harm" associated with a handgun comes more
from its criminal utilization and not from some peculiar defect in the product
itself.54 Hence, a properly functioning handgun cannot be considered legally
"defective" just because it is used in a violent crime.
Plaintiffs have made creative attempts to hold handgun manufacturers
responsible for the criminal acts of third parties under existing products liability
laws. Recent products liability claims allege that the lack of proper anti-theft
48 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964) that provides:
(I) one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if (a) the seller is engaged in
the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user
or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold. (2) the
rule stated in subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of its product, and (b) the user or consumer has not
bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
,49 See McClurg, supra note 40, at 778 (note that the one of the factors courts use in determining
ultrahazardous activity is substantially similar to the risk-utility test used in products liability cases).
so RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 402A (1964); see also Steffey, supra note 36 at 162-63.
51 See Kairys supra note 10, at 15 (citing a plethora of case law rejecting the application of products
liability law on the sale, distribution, or use of handguns).
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
53 See Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1332.
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devices make handguns too easy for criminals to misuse them and therefore
constitute a design defect. Although this claim might give a court the authority to
weigh the risks and utilities of a specific handgun product, no court has ever done
so.' In Kelley v. R.G. Industries,57 the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld a very
limited cause of action against handgun manufacturers responsible for producing
and marketing "Saturday Night Special" handguns. Using a quasi risk-utility
analysis, the Maryland Court of Appeals held a manufacturer strictly liable for
injuries inflicted by "Saturday Night Special" handguns under a common law
theory not a product liability theory."9 The court found that Saturday Night Specials
were "socially useless" handguns that posed too high of a risk for being easily
misused.63 Those who thought that Kelley might open the floodgates for similar
suits against the handgun industry continue to wait in vain.61 No other state or
federal court has ever followed the decision in Kelley.62 In fact, the Maryland
General Assembly passed a law overturning Kelley and expressly making Saturday
Night Special Handguns completely legal products to sell and manufacture.63
Judge Weinstein's 1996 summary judgment opinion, in Hamilton, echoed
the overwhelming national trends precluding products liability claims from being
waged against handgun manufacturers. " In Hamilton, the plaintiffs alleged that the
handgun manufacturers were liable under products liability law for failing to
manufacture handguns with anti-theft devices that could have prevented criminal
misuse.6 Although Judge Weinstein agreed that a handgun is potentially a
"dangerous product" that presents some risk of harm, he acknowledged that the
55 See Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1912 (1984).
5 See McClurg, supra note 40, at 785 (citations omitted).
57 497 A.2d 1143, 1145 (Md. 1985).
58 "Saturday Night Specials" are generically defined as a cheap, .32 caliber, short-barreled handguns.
See id. at 1153-1154.
s9 See id. at 1149.
60 See id. at 1153-54. The court dismissed the argument that these easily concealable handguns
may have some had some social utility in personal protection or sport.
61 See, e.g., Steffey supra note 34.
62 See Joi Garner Pearson, Make it, Market it, and You May Have to Pay for It: An Evaluation of
Gun Manufacturer Liability for the Criminal Use of Uniquely Dangerous Firearms in Light of in Re 101
California Street, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REv. 131, 144 (1997).
63 See MD. ANN. CODE Art. 27, §36()(b)(1)(Supp. 1990).
6 Suits based on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965), which set forth the
principles of strict liability have never been applied to handgun marketing, sale, or distribution practices. See,
e.g., Delahanty, 564 A.2d 760-61 (rejecting claims based on §402(A)); Riordan v. Int'l Armament, Corp., 477
N.E.2d 1293, 1298 (II1. App. Ct. 1985)(rejecting strict liability claim); and Hammond v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 565 A.2d. 558, 563 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989)(refusing to apply products liability law to the
manufacturing and distribution of handguns).
65 Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1321-22.
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"very purpose [of a handgun] is to cause injury - to kill and to wound. '" Judge
Weinstein recognized that common sense requires that "there must be something
wrong with a product" in order to sustain a claim under products liability law.67 The
court rejected plaintiffs' anti-theft safety device theory as being purely
"hypothetical" and a non-viable design alternative.
68
IV. A LANDMARK APPLICATION OF THE NEGLIGENT MARKETING AND
DISTRIBUTION DOCTRINE
Common law negligence requires that a plaintiff prove: (1) that the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) that the defendant breached this
duty by engaging in conduct posing an unreasonable risk of harm; and (3) that the
defendant's breach proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries.6 9 Although
negligence has a long and established history in common law jurisprudence, the
negligent marketing and distribution doctrine has been narrowly applied in a
limited number of civil cases.70
The first case where a plaintiff filed a negligent marketing and distribution
claim against a handgun manufacturer was Linton v. Smith & Wesson. 1 In Linton, a
woman who had been shot by an intoxicated criminal sued Smith & Wesson, the
manufacturer of the handgun used in the crime.72 The plaintiffs novel suit alleged
that Smith & Wesson had a "duty to use 'reasonable means to prevent the sale of its
handguns to persons who are likely to cause harm to the public.', 7 3 The Illinois
State Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's dismissal of the case holding that the
defendant had met its duty to the public by complying with all state and federal
statutory regulations "which serve [d] to filter out high-risk purchasers much as a
common-law duty of care would. 7 4 For the next ten years, Linton remained one of
the most commonly cited cases in the dismissal of negligent marketing and
distribution claims.
75
66 See id. at 1322.
67 Id. at 1323 (citing DeRosa v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 762, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
68 See id. at 1332-33.
69 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d, at 818 (citing numerous New York common law cases).
70 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997) (hollow point "black talon"
bullets); Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 727, 736 (2d Cir. 1979)(prescription drug Quadrigen);
Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc.. 791 F.2d 1532, 1533-34. (11th Cir. 1986) (Saturday Night Special
handguns); and Fomi v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (semiautomatic handguns).
71 469 N.E.2d 339 (111. App. Ct. 1984).
72 See id. at 340.
Id.
74 See Lytton, supra note 1, at 700.
75 See, e.g., Riordan v. Int'l Armament, Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (I11. App. Ct. 1985);
Trespalacios v. Valor Corp. 486 So. 2d 649, 650-51 (Fla. 1986); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 748
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The first time a negligent marketing and distribution claim was able to
withstand a summary judgment challenge against a handgun manufacturer was in
1998.76 In a highly publicized case, Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel, Inc.,77 four parents
sued a conglomerate of handgun manufacturers for injuries that resulted from a
brutal attack on a van carrying a group of Hasidic Jewish children in New York
City.78 The judge who presided over that landmark case was none other than Senior
Judge, Jack Weinstein. 79 Although the plaintiffs in Halberstam were ultimately
unsuccessful in proving that the defendants' negligent conduct was a proximate
cause of the criminal shootings at issue,80 it was the first case in history where a
judge allowed the jury to determine whether handgun manufacturers owed a duty
of care to keep guns out of criminal hands."' In many ways, Halberstam laid the
foundation for Hamilton's recognition of a duty for handgun manufacturers to
exercise reasonable care in marketing and distributing handguns to the general
public.
A. A Once Impossible Duty: Guarding Against Criminal Misuse
The basic theory of the negligent marketing claim is that a handgun
manufacturer should be held liable for failing to take reasonable steps in the
marketing and distribution process that would minimize the risk of criminal misuse
and harm. 2 A handgun manufacturer acts negligently if it fails to keep handguns
out of the well-supplied "black market. '' 3 Unlike the cases where plaintiffs sought
to impose a legal duty upon individual manufacturers for marketing a defective
product,84 the Hamilton plaintiffs sought to hold the entire handgun industry liable
for its marketing and distribution techniques, methods, and procedures.8 5 The
P.2d 661, 664 (Wash. 1988). All of these cases paralleled the opinion in Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 469
N.E.2d 339 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) that a handgun manufacturer will not be held liable for the criminal acts of a
third party as long as it markets and distributes its products in accordance with state and federal laws.
76 See generally, Lytton, supra note 1.
77 No. 95 Civ. 3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (unpublished opinion cited in Lytton, supra note I.)
78 See Lytton, supra note I, at 3. (Mr. Rashid Baz was sentenced to life in prison for the death of
Aaron Halberstam and the shooting ofNachum Sosonkin. Baz was a Palestinian who apparently was seeking
retaliation for a massacre that had killed nearly 29 Palestinians in Hebron, Israel four days earlier).
79 See id. at 687.
80 See id. at 697-698. The jury returned a special verdict for the defendants finding that although the
defendants were negligent for marketing parts that substantially contributed to the deaths but the defendant's
negligence was not a proximate cause of the harm. See id. at 697-698.
81 See Lytton, supra note 1, at 681.
82 See Iveson, supra note 35, at 788.
83 The underground, illegal trafficking of stolen handguns is considered the "black market" in the
industry. See Tyrone Hughes, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek: Potential Collective Liability of the Handgun Industry
for Negligent Marketing, 13 TOURO L. REV. 287,288 (1996).
84 See cases and accompanying text supra note 64.
85 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 808. -
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Hamilton plaintiffs argued that handgun manufacturers owed them an important
legal obligation to "exercise reasonable care in marketing and distributing
[handguns] so as to guard against the risk of ... criminal misuse."816 Complicating
the analysis was the fact that the Hamilton plaintiffs also had to prove that the
handgun manufacturers owed them a duty of care for protection against the harms
inflicted by the criminal acts of a third party. As the court noted, "courts are
reluctant to impose a duty to anticipate the criminal or tortious conduct of third
parties"'87 absent some "special relationship" between the defendant and the third
party.8 Yet, Judge Weinstein cited two policy justifications for his conclusion that
the defendant handgun manufacturers owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs for the
criminal acts of a third party.8 9
First, the court stated that the special ability of manufacturers to detect and
guard against the risks associated with criminal misuse placed them in a "protective
relationship" with those who may potentially be harmed. 90 Although Judge
Weinstein had flatly rejected ultrahazardous liability policy arguments three years
earlier, he indicated that manufacturers have a special responsibility to the victims
of handgun crimes because of the inherent dangerousness of handguns. 9' Without
citing any of the specific risks associated with easy access to handguns, the court
found it justifiable to impose a very limited duty on manufacturers to take
"reasonable steps available at the point of their sale to primary distributors to
reduce the possibility that [handguns] will fall into the hands of those likely to
misuse them." 92 Judge Weinstein anchored his opinion around Justice Cardozo's
bedrock idiom, that "the risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be
obeyed, and risk imports relation.
913
Second, the court found that there was a duty owed to the plaintiffs
because of the handgun manufacturers' special relationship with distributors and
86 Id. at 824.
87 Id. at 819 (citing e.g., Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (N.Y. 1988) (finding it
unreasonable to impose responsibility for negligent conduct of another "where regardless of the measures
taken, there was little expectation that the one responsible could prevent the negligent conduct")).
88 Id. at 820 (an example of a special relationship is a carrier and its passenger or a tavern owner and
its patron).
89 See id. at 827. Because the issue whether a handgun manufacturer owes a duty of care to victims
of criminal shootings had never been addressed specifically by the Eastern District of New York or the
Second Circuit, Judge Weinstein had to decide the issue as the state's highest court would have decided it on
first impression. The duty of care issue was subsequently certified by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to
the New York Supreme Court in Hamilton v. Baretta USA Corp., No. 99-7753, 99-7785, 99-7787, 2000 WL
1160699, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2000). As of this publication date, the Supreme Court of New York had not
decided whether handgun manufacturers owe a duty of care to the public to prevent the criminal misuse of
handguns.
90 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 821-22.
91 See id. at 821 (citing Iveson, supra note 35 at 787).
92 Id. at 825.
93 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 821 (citing Justice Cardozo's famous axiom from Palsgraf v. Long
Island RR. Co., 248 N.E.2d 4,7 (N.Y. 1928)).
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retailers.94 The court ruled that because handgun manufacturers have sufficient
control over their downstream distributors, "it is not unfair for the law to minimize
unreasonable risk of harm through the imposition of a duty on manufacturers to
market and distribute [their handguns] responsibly."95 Surprisingly, Judge
Weinstein indicated that handgun manufacturers have a duty under the "negligent
entrustment doctrine."'' Negligent entrustment liability arises from "selling
potentially dangerous products to consumer groups that lack the capacity to
exercise ordinary care."97 In Hamilton, the plaintiffs successfully argued that the
negligent entrustment doctrine could be applied to handgun manufacturers who sell
their weapons to consumers who are likely to be involved in criminal activity.98
Although the comparison between "criminals" and those who "lack the capacity to
exercise due care" is subtle, it convinced Judge Weinstein that the handgun
industry was negligent for marketing in areas where gun laws were too weak to
protect consumers from the dangers of possible handgun shootings.99
In sum, Judge Weinstein upheld the jury's decision to hold the defendants
liable for criminal misuse because the gun manufacturers could easily have taken
reasonable steps "to reduce the risk of their products' being sold to persons likely
to misuse them. ' 1° The "reasonable steps" the handgun manufacturers should have
taken may constitute the accepted standard of care for marketing and distributing
handguns in the future.
B. The Standard of Care for Marketing and Distributing Handguns
Hamilton held that a handgun manufacturer is negligent when it breaches
its duty of due care by engaging in conduct that poses an unreasonable risk of harm
to others, even if such a breach included a criminal or intentional act of a third-
person.'0 ' Judge Weinstein quickly rejected the defendants' contention that their
compliance with all relevant laws and regulations was absolute proof that they had
fulfilled their duty to the plaintiffs.'02 The court stated definitively that the standard
of care for the industry in both marketing and manufacturing handguns "must be
See id.
95 Id. at 824.
9 See id. at 821. This doctrine imposes liability upon commercial distributors who provide goods to
those they know have a propensity to them in an improper or dangerous fashion. See, e.g., Earsing v. Nelson,
212 A.D.2d 66, 699 (4th Dept. N.Y. 1995) (plaintiff was hurt by a BB gun and made a negligent entrustment
claim against seller of gun to plaintiff's young friend).
97 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1986).
98 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 821-22.
99 See id. at 822.
100 Id.
101 See id. at 828 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§302A-B (1965)).
102 See id. at 829. (citations omitted).
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assessed according to the standard of a reasonably prudent entity in light of all...
circumstances."10 3 Judge Weinstein stated that "technical compliance with all
relevant laws and regulations is not dispositive . . . the exercise of due care
mandates additional preventative measures where a reasonably prudent person
would have taken them."' 4 This was the first time any court directly contradicted
the long-standing rule of Linton v. Smith & Wesson that state and federal statutes
for gun distribution defined the applicable standard of care.
The overwhelming evidence that there was industry-wide awareness that
.25 caliber handguns were moving illegally through an underground black market
swayed Judge Weinstein. 05 Handgun manufacturers claimed that there was nothing
they could do to prevent the common "straw purchaser" or "convenience
trafficking" problems associated with legal handgun purchases.'06 Straw purchasers
are legal handgun buyers who serve as stand-ins for persons not legally allowed to
purchase a handgun (such as felons and minors).10 7 Convenience trafficking, on the
other hand, is the illegal movement of stolen handguns between states for profit.lo8
Judge Weinstein agreed that there was very little that the handgun manufacturers
could do to stop legal stand-in, or "straw purchasers" from acquiring and selling
handguns to felons and criminals.' 0 9
Conversely, Judge Weinstein indicated there was ample evidence
supporting the jury's conclusion that the defendants could have taken reasonable
steps to guard against the convenience trafficking problem."0 The plaintiffs'
fundamental argument was that handgun manufacturers target their marketing and
distribution efforts in "weak law" states knowing that there is a high probability
that these guns will eventually make their way into the hands of criminals in states
with strict gun laws. 1 Evidence presented by the former head of the United States
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms demonstrated that there was industry-
wide knowledge that handguns often make their way from "weak law" states to
103 Id.
104 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 829 (citing Jemmot v. Rockwell, Mfg., Co., 216 A.D.2d 444,444-45
(2d Dep't N.Y. 1995) and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288(c)(1965) respectively)).
105 See id.
106 See id.
107 See id. at 829.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 830.
110 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 831.
ill See id. States with relatively "weak" gun control laws are referred to as "weak law" states and vice
versa. These are primarily states located in the southeast portion of the United States. Using the Alcohol
Tobacco and Firearm's national tracing database, the plaintiffs' chief expert concluded that roughly 43% of
the illegal guns used in New York City came from southeastern states where gun laws permit an abundance of
cheap handguns. See id. at 830.
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large metropolitan areas and states with strong gun laws. 12
The plaintiffs' persuaded Judge Weinstein that according to the evidence
they present during trial there were three basic steps the defendants could have
taken to reduce "convenience trafficking" between weak law and strong law states:
(1) requiring distributors to sell only to stocking gun dealers, i.e.,
retailers who stock guns for legitimate retail outlets, (2)
prohibiting sales at gun shows where wide-spread unrecorded and
unsupervised sales to non-responsible persons are said to take
place, and (3) analyzing race requests to locate retailers who serve
as crime gun sources, and cutting off distributors who do business
with them.'
13
A former executive of Smith & Wesson testified that "manufacturers could feasibly
rewrite their distribution contracts to allow them to cut off retailers who make
multiple sales and have crime guns repeatedly traced to their stores." ' 14 There was
also evidence presented *by Dr. David Stewart, Chairman of the Marketing
Department of Southern California, that handgun manufacturers could adapt their
marketing agreements, advertisements, and catalogues to reduce the availability of
handguns to persons likely to misuse them." 5
Although Judge Weinstein did not specifically outline a standard of care
for marketing and distributing handguns per se, he opined that the jury could have
reasonably concluded that the "defendants were negligent for failing to take
appropriate steps to reduce the risk of their products being sold to persons with a
propensity to misuse them." '1 6 It remains to be seen whether the "three basic steps"
Judge Weinstein outlined in Hamilton will ultimately become the standard of care
for marketing and distributing handguns.
C. Transcending Causation: A Lesson from the Tobacco Inclustry
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Hamilton decision was its
conquest of the proximate causation issue that had been fatal in the Halberstam
case.117 By incorporating strong public policy arguments from Blue Cross & Blue
112 See id.
113 Id. These were the suggestions compiled from the plaintiffs' expert witnesses. Some of the
suggestions that the plaintiffs' marketing specialist, Dr. David Stewart, offered included franchising retail
stores, restricting distribution to qualified retail stores, and also terminating distribution agreements with
those who sell handguns irresponsibly. See id. at 831.
114 Id. at 832.
115 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 832.
116 Id. at 831.
117 See Lytton, supra note I at fn. 97 (citing the jury's special verdict form that asked, "[d]id the
defendants' negligence cause Arron Halberstam's death?" The jury's answer was "no").
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Shield of New Jersey v. Phillip Morris,18 a recent tobacco liability case, Judge
Weinstein was able to articulate how the defendants' failure to market and
distribute their handguns with reasonable care was a proximate cause of the
plaintiffs' injuries.119 Quoting his own opinion in Blue Cross Blue Shield of New
Jersey, Judge Weinstein wrote:
It is difficult to imagine a set of circumstances that would militate
more strongly in favor of a finding of proximate cause... than the
present one. If the allegations are to be believed, the defendants in
this suit are responsible for many unnecessary deaths through their
careless marketing and distribution of handguns. . . the
defendants' alleged misconduct entails moral opprobrium of
extraordinary proportions. Society has an especially compelling
interest in deterring future harms of the type and magnitude
alleged [and proved in this case]. 12
Judge Weinstein clearly felt that the "causal connection between the defendant's
negligence and plaintiffs injury should be ... a matter of legal policy" and he
subsequently relaxed the standard for proving proximate causation in Hamilton.
121
Not surprisingly, the defendants in Hamilton urged Judge Weinstein to
overturn the jury's findings on proximate causation in their post-trial motions.1 2
The defendants claimed that "the issue of causation should ... never have been
submitted to the jury because any causal connection between the plaintiffs' injuries
and negligent conduct on the part of any defendant was broken by the intentional
criminal conduct of the shooters." 123 The "superseding cause" doctrine holds that a
criminal act of a third party effectively cuts off the imposition of civil liability on
the defendant.124 The Restatement of Torts specifically recognizes that the criminal
act of a third party is usually a superseding cause of the harm alleged. 25 Without
much discussion on the superseding causation problem, Judge Weinstein dismissed
118 36 F. Supp.2d 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
119 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 833.
120 Id. (citing Judge Weinstein's paraphrased opinion in Blue Cross Blue Shield v. Phillip Morris, 36
F. Supp.2d 560, 584-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)).
121 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 833. For a good background on the pubic policy arguments
discussed by Judge Weinstein, see David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
"Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 849 (1984).
122 See id. at 835.
123 Id.
124 See, e.g., Richman v. Charter Arms, Corp, 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983). The court wrote, "a
defendant can escape liability by proving third-person fault only if the third-person fault 'is the sole cause of
the damage;' that is, only if 'the intervening third person's act is in the nature of a superseding cause in Anglo
American tort law. Id at 205.
125 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §448 (1965).
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the defendants' argument and cited a plethora of rare cases where the superseding
cause rule was abandoned by New York courts.126
Judge Weinstein wrote that the criminal misuse of handguns by third
parties was "not only a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendants'
negligent marketing and distribution practices, it was the precise risk; failure to
take reasonable steps to guard against it what made the defendants' conduct
negligent." 127 In circling back to the defendants' prescribed duty at issue in the
case, Judge Weinstein concluded that "when the intervening, intentional act of
another is itself the foreseeable harm that shapes the duty imposed, the defendant
who fails to guard against such conduct will not be relieved of liability.1 28 In the
end, the defendants in Hamilton could not overcome New York's incredibly
relaxed standard for proving proximate cause in mass tort cases. 29
D. The Imposition ofMarket Share Liability
Generally, regardless of the theory upon which liability in an action is
predicated, courts have stated that in order to hold a producer, manufacturer, or
seller liable for injury caused by a particular product, there must be proof that the
defendant being sued is the entity that actually produced, manufactured, sold, or
was in some way responsible for the product.'3 In those situations in which the
identity of the specific manufacturer of the product is unknown, collective liability
theories have come to the rescue. 31 Collective liability theories allow plaintiffs to
recover damages from an entire class of defendants without having to identify the
particular defendant whose tortious act or omission caused their injuries. 32 Hence,
plaintiffs are effectively relieved from the onerous burden of proving that a
particular defendant was the "sole proximate cause" of the harm alleged.
Collective liability allows a particular defendant's liability to be replaced
with the liability of a group of defendants. It allows a plaintiff to establish liability
where "proof of causation is impossible and a method of apportioning damages"
may be extremely difficult. 33 The policy behind collective liability is "the
126 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 833-34. (citing e.g., Kush v. City of Buffalo, 449 N.E.2d 725
(N.Y. 1980)(intentional shooting of plaintiff in lobby of an office building with history of criminal activity
not a supervening cause); Rotz v..City of New York, 143 A.D.2d. 301 (1st Dept. N.Y. 1988 (acts of third
person initiating stampede in Central Park concert not supervening cause of plaintiff's injuries)).
127 Id. (emphasis added).
128 Id. at 834 (citations omitted).
129 See id. at 835.
130 See generally, 63 AM. JUR. 2D, Products Liability § 5.
131 See Richard E. Kaye, "Concert of Activity," "Alternate Liability," "Enterprise Liability," or
Similar Theory as Basis for Imposing Liability Upon One or More Manufacturers of Defective Uniform
Product, In Absence of Identification of Manufacturer of Precise Unit or Batch Causing Injury, 63 A.L.R.
5TH 195, 215 (1998).
132 See id. at 200.
133 Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1329.
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expanding nature of tort law and the need for courts to adapt traditional theories of
recovery to keep pace with the evolving requirements of contemporary society."' 4
New York recognizes all of the existing theories of collective liability: alternative
liability, enterprise liability, concerted action liability, and market share liability. 135
Most observers agree that state and federal courts in New York have been at the
forefront of expansionist collective liability decisions especially in the area of
market share liability.'3
Market share liability was first applied in the DES drug manufacturer cases
of the 1970s. 3 r In the famous case, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,38 a large class
of plaintiffs were unable to definitively prove which particular DES drug
manufacturer allegedly caused their children's injuries.' 39 Rather than leaving the
plaintiffs remediless, the California Supreme Court eliminated the requirement that
the plaintiffs identify a particular DES manufacturer who was responsible for their
injuries. The Court held that "that an individual's share of liability should at least
be based on its probability (per its market share) of causing the harm alleged."' 40
Each DES manufacturer defendant was held liable according to its share of the
overall DES market. 41 Since Sindell, the market share doctrine has been expanded
to a variety of other products such as asbestos, blood products, lead paint, and
142vaccines.
Like the DES cases, the Hamilton court allowed the imposition of market
share liability for gun manufacturers because Stephen Fox was unable to identify
the exact manufacturer of the handgun that caused his injuries. 143 Not surprisingly,
Judge Weinstein grounded his application of market share liability in Hamilton on
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.,144 a DES case where the New York Court of Appeals
first adopted market share liability.1 45 He stated that the following factors support
134 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 842.
135 See id. at 839.
136 See id. at 842-43; see also, VanVoris, supra note 2.
137 DES is a pre-natal drug that many women took during pregnancy. DES has been linked to various
types of birth defects. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 840.
138 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (this was the first case to eliminate the identification requirement for
plaintiffs suing the manufacturers of a specific product).
139 See id. The plaintiffs had trouble linking their injuries to any one particular DES manufacturer
because of the generic chemical composition of DES and the large number of manufactures who were
producing and marketing the drug.
140 See id. at 937.
141 See id.
142 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 841 (citations omitted).
143 See id. at 843.
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the imposition of market share liability for the handgun manufacturers in Hamilton:
the superior ability of defendant to bear the costs foreseeable
associated with the manufacture and widespread distribution of
handguns; (2) the fairness of requiring them to do so since they
can reduce their risks by their ability to choose merchandising
techniques; (3) the deterrent potential of placing the burden on
manufacturers careless of their responsibilities to the public; (4)
the fact that injured plaintiffs, unlike the users of products which
later turn out to be defective, did not chose their connection with
handguns. Under such circumstances the law will not leave the
injured unrequited."e
Although Judge Weinstein firmly upheld the plaintiffs' right to use market share
liability within a particular class of handgun manufacturers, he stopped short of
allowing full-blown market share liability claims against the entire handgun
industry.
Judge Weinstein's summary judgment in 1996 opened the door for the
jury's successful imposition of collective liability on the Hamilton defendants. 47 In
allowing the plaintiffs to pursue alternative theories of liability against the handgun
manufacturers, Judge Weinstein indicated that the plaintiffs would not have to
show that a particular defendant was specifically liable for their injuries. Instead,
they could demonstrate that the collective efforts of handgun manufacturers
negligently flooded the underground handgun market.148 The Hamilton court
indicated that the "primary motivating factor [in deciding whether to impose
collective liability] has been the injustice of barring innocent plaintiffs' recovery
solely because of their inability to identify which of a number of wrongdoing
defendants caused their injuries. '" 49
At the Hamilton trial, it was obvious that Stephen Fox would never be able
to prove which particular handgun company manufactured the .25 caliber handgun
used in his shooting.15 The police were only able to recover a spent .25 caliber
shell at the crime scene where Stephen Fox was shot.'5' Judge Weinstein's
instructions to the jury on collective liability indicated that there were three distinct
possibilities in the case:
(1) that no party had proven that the gun at issue was made by any
particular manufacturer or group and as such could apportion
146 Id.
147 See Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1330-3 1.
148 See Hughes, supra note 83, at 297-98. (citing Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1329).
149 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 841.
ISO See id. at 837.
151 See id. at 845.
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liability in proportion to each manufacturers market share of all
handguns; (2) that it had been proven that the gun at issue had
been made by a particular manufacturer and could assess 100% of
plaintiffs damages against it; or (3) the gun was a particular
caliber of guns and that only one of a number of manufactures
could have manufactured it such that market share liability could
also be imposed in this situation.
15 2
Any number of defendants may have manufactured the specific handgun used in
the crime, yet under market share liability, the jury held three manufacturers liable
for Stephen Fox's injuries according to its respective share of the national handgun
market: American Arms, Inc. (.23% liable), Beretta U.S.A. Corporation (6.03%
liable), and Taurus International Manufacturing (6.8% liable). '53
V. THE FUTURE OF MARKET SHARE LIABILITY FOR THE HANDGUN INDUSTRY:
LIABILITY WITHOUT A SMOKING GUN? 1'
The essential question surrounding the Hamilton decision is whether other
federal or state courts across the country will adopt Judge Weinstein's expansive
approach to handgun manufacturer liability. Judge Weinstein's candid recognition
that "New York's approach to market share liability is in many ways more radical
than that of other courts which have adopted the theory" may be the definitive
reason why many other state and federal courts will likely find themselves unable
or unwilling to apply the novel liability theories used in Hamilton. 55 Indeed, only
two federal circuits and a handful of state courts have ever recognized market share
liability for any case.'-6 Additionally, those few state and federal courts that have
recognized market share liability have only applied it to a narrow class of products
liability actions. Given that the overwhelming majority of state and federal courts
have explicitly rejected the possibility of imposing market share liability beyond
products liability cases, it seems highly unlikely that even these courts would be
152 See id. at 849-50.
See id. at 808.
154 Liability without a "smoking gun" refers to the Hamilton plaintiffs' imposition of market share
liability on the three defendant handgun manufacturers even though police never found a gun at the crime
scene.
155 Id. at 842-43. (recognizing that only a handful of states and one federal circuit have recognized
market share liability).
156 State courts that have recognized some form of market share liability are Texas, California,
Florida, Hawaii, New York, Massachusetts, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin. Most of the cases
where market share liability has been applied involved products liability claims against pharmaceutical
manufacturers. See e.g., Sindell, 607 P.2d at 924; Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990);
Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991); McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521
(D. Mass. 1985); Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1069; McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 (D.S.D.
1983); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981); George v. Parke-Davis,
733 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1987); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984).
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willing to extend collective liability claims against gun manufacturers absent proof
of traditional causation.
There has been no indication that those jurisdictions that currently refuse
to recognize market share liability in products liability cases would likely adopt it
in a case similar to Hamilton. Those courts who have continually rebuked
plaintiffs' attempts to hold defendants liable under market share liability often cite
very similar policy concerns. In Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 157 an Illinois DES product
liability case, the Illinois State Supreme Court gave the following reasons why it
does not recognize market share liability:
(1) the difficulty of establishing... defendants' percentages of the
market; (2) the theory's potential to treat plaintiffs who cannot
identify the specific manufacturer responsible [for the injuries]
more favorably than those who can, because.., the market-share
theory permits a plaintiff who cannot identify the responsible
manufacturer to spread the liability throughout the members of the
industry, reducing the risk that the plaintiff will be without a
solvent defendant; (3) the possibility that the defendant actually
responsible for the plaintiff's injuries may not be before the court,
[and] ... that a wholly innocent [defendant] ... will shoulder part
or all of the responsibility for the injury caused... ; (4) the failure
of the market-share theory to serve the purposes expressed in the
underlying principles of products liability law; and (5) the
theory's disregard for the principle that manufacturers are not
insurers of their industry. 58
Judge Weinstein recognized in Hamilton that handguns are rarely recovered and
identified in criminal shootings. Unfortunately, without a "smoking gun," future
plaintiffs will have trouble linking their injuries to the negligence of an individual
handgun manufacturer.1 59 Because the overwhelming majority of federal and state
courts require traditional proof of proximate causation, the future applicability of
Hamilton will likely hinge upon other courts' unlikely willingness adopt or expand
some form of alternative liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
As of September 2000, twenty-nine suits were pending against various
handgun manufacturers for their alleged negligent marketing and distribution
practices.16 City mayors and county representatives from some of America's
157 560 N.E.2d 324 (III. 1990).
158 See id. (internal citations omitted).
159 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 844.
160 See Following in Tobacco's Footstep: Three Cities Take Aim at Gun Manufacturers, PROD. LIAB.
L. & STRAT., December 1998; but cf. Kairys, supra note 10.
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largest urban areas have filed suits against the handgun industry for reimbursement
of both law enforcement and health costs that stem from the criminal misuse of
handguns. 161 Even the NAACP filed a suit against handgun manufacturers in Judge
Weinstein's court for turning urban communities into "war zones" through the
negligent sale and distribution of handguns. 62 Since Judge Weinstein issued his
post-trial opinion in June 1999, only one judge has ruled definitively,
notwithstanding Hamilton, whether a city could sue gun manufacturers under the
negligent marketing and distribution doctrine. 163 In the Ohio Court of Common
Pleas, Judge Robert Ruehlman dismissed the city of Cincinnati's negligence suit
without issuing a written opinion. 164 Reporters, who were present in the courtroom
when the judge issued his dismissal, stated that the judge felt the suit was an
"improper attempt to use the courts to legislate controls over firearms.
165
Although the court's willingness to apply market share liability in
Hamilton was a decisive victory for Stephen Fox and his family, it will likely
prevent many other plaintiffs outside the Eastern District of New York from
recovering under similar negligence claims. Judge Weinstein's opinion recognized
that "market share theory is really a rule of last resort" that is not by any means
required when a plaintiff cannot prove causation.' 66 Although many other courts
throughout the country will likely be persuaded by Hamilton's landmark adoption
of a new duty for handgun manufacturers to market and distribute their guns with
reasonable care, without a smoking gun, many plaintiffs will likely be left empty
handed.
Colin K Kelly-
161 See Myron Levin, Judge Rejects Cincinnati's Suit Against Gun Makers, L.A. TIMES, October 8,
1999, at Al. (Cities include New Orleans, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Atlanta, New Haven and
Bridgeport, CT; New York City, Miami, Cincinnati, Detroit, Cleveland, St. Louis, Boston, Camden and
Camden County N.J., Newark, N.J., and Wayne County Michigan).
162 See Frank Murray, NAACP Will Sue Makers of Firearms., WASH. TIMES, July 13, 1999, at A 1,
11. (If the group survives the very difficult battle over issues of legal standing to sue gun manufacturers, it
will likely sue under both ultrahazardous liability and negligent marketing and distribution theories).
163 See Myron Levin Judge Rejects Cincinnati's Suit Against Gun Makers, Los ANGELES TIMES, Oct.
8, 1999, at Al.
164 Id. Note that this quote does not come directly from any written opinion ofJudge Ruehlman.
165 Id.
166 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 844.
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